adapted guidelines for public health provision during emergencies was published in 1992, drawing from journal articles written earlier. 3 These guidelines were expanded upon in the MSF book, Refugee Health: An Approach to Emergency Situations, which was the most cited guide in the field until it was joined by the first iteration of the Sphere Standards in 1998. 7, 8 All three of the guides stressed measles immunization as the highest priority. In the US, approximately one in 20,000 reported cases results in a death. 9 In Biafra, it was shown that in some outbreaks, 50% of cases died. 4 The monitoring and documenting of explosive measles outbreaks in Biafra and Southeast Asia in the years that followed established that the provision of Vitamin A and measles immunizations were a priority uniquely important during crises. Other priorities emphasized in all three of the guidelines included the provision of adequate sanitation, water, and food, issues that governments expected populations to address for themselves in more stable settings. Most of the medical and public health measures that, at present, are widely provided for displaced populations have been identified and justified by data from past crises. Thus, it is not by chance that all three guides recommended the rapid establishment of a health surveillance network, not just to respond to problems as they arose, but also to assure that the lessons from each crisis will be learned so that performance might improve during the next crises.
Identifying Hidden Problems
In 1982, patients in Somalia appeared in clinics with an unknown illness. On the weekly data surveillance form, there was a line that was labeled "other", followed by a blank space. Several cases appeared per week with comments to the effect of "swollen knees" or "sore joints". The government sent an expanded data form to the clinics requesting further information about the unusual cases. Of the next 72 cases reported, 92% had a painful knee, 75% had pain in more than one joint, 61% had weakness of the legs, 60% had gingivitis, and 40% had fever. Given this constellation of symptoms, it was suspected that these patients, mostly children, were experiencing scurvy. A trial treatment regimen of vitamin C-rich camel's milk alleviated the symptoms and later X-ray confirmation of the scurvy diagnosis was possible. 10 In this instance, the problem was identified through standard, clinic-based surveillance and the suspected problem was affirmed through a simple clinical trial.
At the start of 1990, the World Food Programme (WFP) removed ground nuts from the ration provided to Mozambican refugees in Malawi. Within a couple of months, cases of symmetrical rashes around the neck, sometimes accompanied with diarrhea, appeared in clinics. Médecins sans Frontièrs had detected 1,169 cases of pellagra among refugees in 1989 and was sensitized to this nutritional disorder associated with niacin deficiency, which primarily occurs among people with a corn-based diet. When the 1990 outbreak began, MSF established an active case-finding process in the camps in which they worked. During the peak month of August, 10,000 cases were identified. That month, a groundnut source was identified and arrangements were made for all refugees living in mative emergency experience in Biafra building runways. 2 Doctors working for the Red Cross were so disturbed by the neutrality constraints of the ICRC, that they formed Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) as an alternative. Most importantly, the precedent was set that private groups forevermore would intervene in the internal affairs of nations when large numbers of human lives were at risk.
Thus, it is not surprising that the science of health data collection bloomed during this conflict. For instance, because the Quaker-affiliated American Friends Service Committee could not appropriately triage malnourished children with regard to their extent of malnutrition, they developed a device for comparing the mid-upper arm of a child with their height. The device was referred to as a QUAK stick and was the precursor of the now well-known Mid Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) method for assessment of malnutrition. This advent was the birth of modern nutritional anthropometry. The (US) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) deployed >12 epidemiologists to the crisis and systematically documented that measles was perhaps the major killer, setting measles immunization as a priority intervention for the response guidelines that followed. 3 Moreover, the CDC and World Health Organization (WHO) workers collected blood samples and were able to discredit the widely held and erroneous belief that malnourished children could not produce an adequate immune response to measles and smallpox immunizations. 4 A young epidemiologist, Carl Western, took a geographically widespread convenience sample assessing the fraction of people that had a smallpox immunization scar. By comparing the records of total doses of vaccine given with the number of people in Biafra at the end of the crisis, he was able to estimate that approximately one million people had died in what is believed to be the first application of a capture-recapture methodology in the public health field.
During the decades since, cluster surveys, grave monitoring procedures, remote sensing, and diagnostic advances have all allowed for an increased capacity to detect and measure morbidity and mortality outcomes in times of armed conflict and disasters. The advent of guidelines and standards, particularly the Sphere Standards, have increased the level of agreement about how monitoring should be undertaken. The discussion that follows is an attempt to highlight areas where these data collection methods have produced major advances in the process of providing health services during emergencies and areas where they have not.
Areas of Success Establishing Public Health Priorities
Refugee and displaced populations tend to experience the same diseases they did before the crisis, but at a higher rate. 5 In Africa, conflict-affected displaced populations have been recorded with a mortality rate 80 times the baseline rate. 6 The adverse synergies that occur in these settings (e.g., between malnutrition and the lethality of infectious diseases, insecurity and access to health facilities, crowding and disease transmission) alter the public health priorities when compared to peaceful settings. The first widely camps to receive vitamin B complex; 11 within three months, the outbreak had subsided. Here, most cases were identified through active case finding among the population. At the time, most key officials in the WFP and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) never had encountered a pellagra outbreak and were skeptical that the condition was serious.
Institutional responses were formed in just months because of the overwhelming numbers of cases and deaths that MSF was able to record through their communitybased case finding approach.
Deaths and births are particularly difficult to monitor in times of war in rural areas where most of the cases do not occur in hospitals and clinics. In 2001, the Government of Sierra Leone and the NGO, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), conducted a mortality survey in Kenema District approximately two years after the cessation of hostilities in the area. In two of the villages visited, another NGO, GOAL, had worked up through 1999, but had not visited for more than one year. The staff of GOAL had given village chiefs a ledger to record deaths. In each village, interviewers visited 10 houses and asked about deaths in the household during the preceding 13 months. A total of five deaths were recorded in the two villages. All five deaths could be verified in the ledgers of the village chiefs and no additional deaths from those interviewed families were recorded. 12 This allowed the survey team to have increased confidence in the quality of the household reporting, an issue that, in the past, has proven problematic in West Africa. 13, 14 Moreover, the fact that all of the interviewee-reported deaths were all found in the chiefs' ledgers suggest that GOAL's exceedingly simple and inexpensive mortality monitoring process could continue long after the NGO had left.
Learning Unexpected Lessons
In early 1992, refugees from Burma fled into southern Bangladesh in large numbers. Between 06 May and 26 June in Ghundum II camp, UNHCR recorded 114 deaths by grave monitoring, 81 (71%) of which were females. A review of outpatient records in the camp during the first week in July found that of 467 clinic visits, 300 (64%) were males. 15 Refugees paid a small fee for attending clinics to avoid disrupting the government's fee-for-use clinic system. It was realized that in this impoverished refugee population, females systematically were not being taken to clinics when ill. The fee was removed and the differential between male and female mortality disappeared within weeks. In this case, both the grave monitoring system and the clinic attendance monitoring were needed to identify this health access problem and to rectify it. The monitoring of burials has become a standard component of health surveillance programs in camp settings.
Another example where surveillance provided the learning of an unexpected positive lesson occurred among Burundian refugees in Tanzania. The total monthly births and births below 2,500 grams (5.5 pounds; considered low birth weight (LBW) events) for Mtendeli Camp, Tanzania, beginning in January of 1998 and running for the next three and a half years are graphed in Figure 1 . The refugee camp maintained a relatively constant population during this period. Two striking findings from these data are the overall drop in births in late 1998 and the apparent concurrent reduction in the fraction of all births that were low birth weight, changing from one-third of all births in early 1998 to less than 10% from 1999 through 2001. The dip in overall births is attributed to a dramatic hyper-endemic period of malaria in early 1998. In March 1998, 36% of the population was diagnosed with and treated for malaria. The drop in the number of births five to eight months later potentially is related to malaria-induced pregnancy loss. But the drop in LBW babies was not related to the malaria. In April 1998, the antenatal program in the camp, which was not well utilized, began giving food supplements to pregnant women who enrolled. Until that time, antenatal services had been limited to physical examinations, some education, vitamin supplements, and testing and treatment for syphilis and malaria. The reduction in LBW events began just four months after the addition of the supplementary food ration to the antenatal services. However, what was extraordinary and unexpected about this program was that it also seems to have dramatically reduced the fraction of all births where umbilical blood tested positive for syphilis. In 1997 and early 1998, 3% of all births tested as syphilis positive. From 1999 through 2001, this fraction was reduced to less than 1%. 16 Thus, it seems that providing food supplements to pregnant women, which convinced them to better utilize antenatal clinics, was an extremely useful method of controlling syphilis in this setting. This lesson only was learned by the ongoing and steady collection of surveillance data over time as these programmatic changes occurred.
While surveillance and survey methodologies exist to detect and describe a vast array of health events during times of emergencies, their existence has not solved all of the problems of humanitarian relief associated with a lack of health information.
Areas of Shortcomings Improving the Quality of Public Health Service Delivery
Several assessments have been conducted attempting to look at either the collection of health data or the efficacy of health programs by various humanitarian organizations. Generally, they have found that health data collection is of such poor or inconsistent quality that it has not contributed meaningfully to an evidence-based humanitarian response. Following the crisis and US invasion of Somalia in the early 1990s, from 1991-1993, researchers from the CDC assessed the mortality and collected nutritional survey data from a host of organizations. 17 They found that the methods used were so varied and inconsistent that collective analysis or comparisons from location to location were not possible. A decade later, the CDC investigators reviewed 126 nutritional surveys conducted in Ethiopia from 1999-2000. Only 67 of the surveys (53%) contained a representative sample with the remainder identifying children through convenient or haphazard methods. Only six (5%) contained the minimum, standard number of children and at least 30 clusters were required to be representative. 18 An assessment of the humanitarian relief efforts in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide found a similar lack of health records regarding aid provided during that crisis. 19 Likewise, an assessment of the applicability of the Sphere Standards to improve the quality of humanitarian relief found little evidence of improved program quality, in large part because of a lack of documentation of health projects. 20 Most recently, a review of all final reports of health-related projects funded by the US Department of State's Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration found that only four of 15 projects (27%) completed in 2003 could show that health benefits occurred. Six of these 15 multi-year projects (40%) provided no health data within the final reports. 21 The five assessments detailed above say little about the ability of aid to go to those most in need, the appropriateness or quality of the services provided, or the acceptance and benefits of these efforts on the part of beneficiaries. But, given a widespread inability of relief agencies to systematically collect health data using appropriate methods, it seems unlikely that use of the health data is contributing widely to the quality of humanitarian health services on either the local or national level.
Ability of Health Data to set Humanitarian Priorities Globally
In August 2006, the National Review published a summary of the global money raised by international charities on recent urgent issues or events (Table 1) . 22 It is of little surprise that more is spent on events that affect or threaten people in the wealthier nations. Such disparities in expenditures on humanitarian causes are enormous. In 1999, it was estimated that the international community spent 100 times more per capita in Kosovo compared to per capita expenditures in the Democratic Republic of Congo in spite of the far greater severity of the African crisis. 23 The inability to set global priorities arises, in part, from the lack of credible authorities who can collect health information in the most violent or politically charged settings. No entity is charged with documenting hardships or deaths during wars or disasters. While it seems this chore should fall to the United Nations, it often is not up to the task. During the genocide in Rwanda, the WHO sent four epidemiologists to collect data in Rwanda, one based in each of the neighboring countries. The idea was that each would attempt to establish surveillance networks from their respective borders and have local officials and NGOs collect the data from clinics and other locations. Because of UN security procedures, only one of the four ever entered Rwanda or produced any health data from within Rwanda during the conflict. Historically, this would not have been significant except that the lone epidemiologist was working in rebel-held areas and detected widespread violent deaths primarily at the hands of the invading Tutsi rebels. 24 This finding is completely at odds to the common, non-scientific narratives about the war that suggest that ethnic Hutus did most of the killing in this ethnically motivated conflict. 25 For this discussion, it is not important whether one side or another did most of the killing in Rwanda; what is important is that UN security constraints on its staff prevented the documentation of what is widely viewed as the greatest crime against humanity in recent decades.
In 2005, the WHO initiated a mortality survey among displaced persons in northern Uganda. They compiled a Advances in Monitoring coalition of partner NGOs, hired an experienced epidemiologist from a reputable school of public health, and agreed upon a methodology with all the parties involved including the Ugandan Ministry of Health. They found elevated mortality in all areas surveyed, and concluded that there had been approximately 1,000 excess deaths per week among displaced persons during the first seven months of 2005. 26 The Ugandan Ministry of State for Information called the Report's findings an exaggeration and the Ugandan President threatened to expel any NGOs that referenced the Report. 27 Although not surprising that the Ugandan government would be displeased with bad news, what was stunning, however, was the WHO's unwillingness to stand behind the Report-a Report that they had financed and instigated. They agreed with the Ugandan government that the survey needed to be repeated without identifying any errors in the Report and refused to participate in the publication of the data. Given that the UN is an organization made up of member states, including those committing atrocities, it stands to reason that a UN agency would have neither the mandate nor the ability to objectively document widespread death events against the will of the host government. Unfortunately, when academics or NGOs attempt to fill the void and collect information to compare the relative severity of conflicts, there remains the challenge to convert that data into global action.
Nowhere has this inability been more dramatically portrayed than in the current Iraq War. Nearly three years into the conflict, in December of 2005, when asked how many Iraqis had died during the conflict in Iraq, US President Bush stated that he thought that approximately 30,000 had died from the initial invasion and violence that followed. This number reflected the tally of Iraqbodycount.org (IBC), a British-based NGO that monitors newspaper reports of deaths in Iraq. Little discussion was made in the press of the fact that three surveys and two poorly documented attempts by Iraqis to count deaths had resulted in estimates that were far higher. 28 The press failed to note that, if this number was correct, then Atlanta, Baltimore, and New Orleans had been experiencing a higher rate of violent death than did the nation of Iraq during the period of occupation. In October 2006, results of a survey published in the Lancet indicated that approximately 650,000 excess deaths had occurred in Iraq during the 40 months following the invasion. 29 In an editorial that accompanied the Report, the Lancet editor went to the extraordinary measure to explain the peer-review process and noted that all four peer reviewers were unanimous in their recommendation to publish the survey results. Nonetheless, when the paper was released, President Bush was asked if he still stood by his estimate of 30,000 Iraqi casualties. While not answering that question directly, he said of the Lancet study, "I do not consider this a credible report" and "600,000 or whatever they guessed at...it is just not credible". 30 The President's simple, uncritical dismissal was widely accepted and most US press coverage continues to cite the incomplete surveillance-based estimates of Iraqi Government or IBC. If the study in Lancet is accurate, and the body of evidence suggests that it is, the crisis in Iraq dwarfs those elsewhere in the world in terms of violent deaths per week; yet there is little talk of Iraq as a humanitarian crisis or of holding the occupying forces accountable for excess mortality. This suggests that quality health data, no matter how evidenced-based or scientifically rigorous, may not be able to influence the world's circles of power where most capacities for ending armed conflict reside.
Conclusions
In summary, the science of humanitarian relief, although still nascent, has begun to establish itself through its ability to understand and prioritize the public health consequences of conflict and disaster on affected populations. Despite the increased emphasis on collecting information to monitor health events in emergencies, improvements in methods for collecting data through surveys and surveillance still are needed. For a variety of reasons not explored here, the use and usefulness of data collected by agencies is limited, thus failing to impact the delivery of aid on a widespread basis beyond defining general priorities. Moreover, health monitoring data and information systems are limited and constrained in their ability to influence policy and identify and prioritize humanitarian crises on a global level. 
